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The Lockerbie case has already contributed significantly to the jurisprudence of the law 
of evidence. Al Megrahi v HM Advocate1continues in that vein, shedding some light on 





Megrahi having unsuccessfully appealed against his conviction for murder, the Scottish 
Criminal Cases Review Commission under s.194B of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) 
Act 1995, referred the case to the High Court on the basis that there may have been a 
miscarriage of justice in the case, since the Crown had not disclosed to the defence the 
existence of two documents which had been given by a foreign authority to the UK 
Government in confidence. Megrahi then presented to the court as petition for the 
recovery of the documents. 
 
The Lord Advocate took the view that it would be appropriate to disclose these 
documents to Megrahi, subject to the right of the Advocate General to raise a plea of 
public interest immunity. The Advocate General, representing the UK government and 
specifically the Foreign Secretary, raised such a plea, producing a public interest 
immunity certificate signed by the Foreign Secretary which indicated that the disclosure 
of the documents would damage the UK government's international relations and threaten 
national security as a result of making foreign governments less wiling to communicate 
information to the UK government and to co-operate in areas such as counter-terrorism. 
 
Counsel for Megrahi argued that the decision whether to disclose a document in her 
possession, during the course of criminal proceedings, must be taken by the Lord 
Advocate in her capacity as head of the system of criminal prosecution. The 
representation of any public interest in criminal proceedings, has been traditionally and 
remains the role of the Lord Advocate, who indeed has a duty to raise any public interest 
objection to disclosure. Thus since no public interest objection had been raised by the 
Lord Advocate, it must be inferred that she did not consider that there was a public 
interest objection to the disclosure of the documents sought. Accordingly, were the 
Advocate General to be entitled to intervene to prevent disclosure by the Lord Advocate, 
this would amount to direct interference by the UK Government in the pursuit of 
independent prosecutions by the Lord Advocate. 
 
The court disagreed, noting2 that while, prior to devolution, the Lord Advocate would 
consider questions of public interest immunity raised by other arms of the UK 
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Government and weigh them against other interests, such competitions would be resolved 
within that Government. However, now that the Lord Advocate cannot be a member of 
the United Kingdom Government, ‘distinct public interests may potentially be publicly in 
competition. To that extent at least there has been a practical change in the Lord 
Advocate's role consequent upon devolution.’ The Lord Advocate’s position that it was in 
the interests of the administration of justice that the documents be released to Megrahi, 
was clearly made subject to the Advocate General's plea of public interest immunity. 
Although the issue of public interest immunity in criminal proceedings had traditionally 
been raised by the Lord Advocate, and in appropriate circumstances might still be raised 
by her, that did not mean that it was always incumbent on the Lord Advocate herself to 
assert that immunity.  Thus where, as in the present case, the particular public interests 
sought to be protected are peculiarly within the governmental responsibility of a UK 
minister, it is appropriate for the Lord Advocate to allow that minister to raise the plea of 
immunity, and permit the issue of competing public interests to be adjudicated upon by 
the court. The court thus rejected Megrahi’s contention that the Advocate General's plea 




The result in this case is hardly surprising, since it was inevitable, following devolution 
and the Lord Advocate consequently ceasing to be a member of the UK government, that 
instances would arise, especially in areas such as national security, where a branch of that 
government would be more appropriately placed than the Lord Advocate to raise a plea 
of public interest immunity. Such a situation has indeed long been predicted by 
commentators3. Thus it seems sensible that in such cases, the Lord Advocate having 
adopted the view that disclosure is in the interests of justice, that position is subject to the 
right of the relevant minister to raise a plea of public interest immunity. Ultimately, it 
will be for the court to decide whether or not to uphold the plea and the court in the 
present case pointed out that ‘[c]onsideration of the issues is likely to be better informed 
if there is represented before the court the party with the closest involvement with the 
public interest potentially in competition with the public interest in the administration of 
justice’.  
 
It is of course implicit in all of this that while the public interest in the administration of 
justice may sometimes trump the competing public interest, there will be occasions when 
it does not, even though the liberty of an innocent man may be at stake. This is especially 
likely to be the case where the competing public interest is a powerful one, as where 
issues of national security are involved. It is clear, moreover, that the right to a fair trial in 
terms of Article 6 of the ECHR does not give an accused an absolute right to demand the 
production of relevant evidence, since the European Court of Human Rights observed in 
Edwards v U.K. that in some cases it may be necessary to withhold certain evidence from 
the defence to safeguard important public interests  such as national security 4. Thus it 
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4 (2003) 15 BHRC 189 at para 53. 
remains to be seen whether the plea of public interest immunity will eventually prevail in 
this case. 
 
It is also clear that there will remain cases where it will be appropriate for the Lord 
Advocate as head of the system of criminal prosecution in Scotland herself to raise a plea 
of public interest immunity e.g. where disclosure of the material in question would 
threaten the efficient operation of the system of the detection and prosecution of crime. In 
this context the court in Megrahi5, having cited the views of Bingham L.J. in Makanjuola 
v Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police6 that since the assertion of public interest 
immunity is not the exercise of a right but the observation of a duty, public interest 
immunity cannot in any ordinary sense be waived, expressly reserved its opinion as to 
whether such a duty is imposed on the Lord Advocate in Scottish criminal proceedings, 
‘and, in particular, whether the Lord Advocate is obliged to place before the court for 
decision every issue which gives rise to a public interest immunity question.’ The court 
cited the example of the Lord Advocate deciding in a particular case that the interests of 
justice required the disclosure of information to an accused, ‘albeit there might be a 
presentable argument that a public interest immunity consideration (say, the protection of 
informers) militated against such disclosure.’ It may be suggested that it would be 
sensible for the Lord Advocate not to be under an absolute duty to raise the plea, since 
although the court is theoretically the final arbiter in such matters, it might be practically 
unworkable if every single instance where the question of the public interest might 
possibly arise required to be placed before the court. It is very likely that in practice the 
relevant ministers already engage in a balancing exercise before deciding to raise a plea 
of public interest immunity, as indeed the Foreign Secretary admitted doing in this case. 
While the question of public interest immunity may theoretically be raised by the judge if 
not raised by a party7, there is no recorded example of this actually happening.         
 
There is also the question of who else might be entitled to raise the plea. Lord Avonside 
stated in Higgins v Burton8 that a claim of public interest could only be put forward ‘by a 
Minister of the Crown or by the Lord Advocate’. This view was echoed by Lord 
Sutherland in Parks v Tayside Regional Council9, who suggested that English decisions 
which suggested that public interest immunity might be claimed by local authorities and 
even private bodies required to be treated with caution in Scotland, albeit that he seemed 
to concede that private bodies might sometimes be able to protect material from 
disclosure by raising a plea of confidentiality. However, the court in Megrahi cited10, 
seemingly with approval, the view of Lord Reid in Rogers v Home Secretary11 that the 
plea might be raised by any interested person. It may be foolish to read too much into 
this, since the relevant dicta are quoted in relation to another issue, so that the question is 
hardly being addressed directly, but it is possible that the Megrahi case hints at a change 
of approach as regards this matter.   
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Finally, it might be asked what significance the case might have as regards the possible 
success of Megrahi’s appeal against conviction. It will be recalled that the Scottish 
Criminal Cases Review Commission had referred his case to the High Court on the basis 
that there may have been a miscarriage of justice because the Crown had not disclosed to 
the defence the existence of the documents in question. The investigatory powers of the 
Commission allow it to secure access to such material12, and it has been held that a plea 
of public interest immunity will not permit documents to be withheld from the 
Commission.13 If the court is able to consider the documents in question, it may be that it 
will agree that there has been a miscarriage of justice because of the existence of 
significant evidence which was not heard at the original proceedings, there being a 
reasonable explanation as to why it was not so heard14. However, this depends on the 
material being available to the court. If an attempt to have the documents disclosed in 
later proceedings is met by a plea of public interest immunity, and that plea is upheld by 
the court, then there will be no new evidence for the court to consider and the appeal 
must fail. Many would regard this as a profoundly unsatisfactory outcome, but it would 
appear that the Lockerbie case may still have some way to go before it has run its course. 
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